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Abstract
We prove the existence of an open loop Nash equilibrium of an
N-person non-zero sum linear-quadratic differential game with bounded
controllers. Due to the method employed, the computational method
of [5], section 5, can be used to uniformly approximate the equilibrium.
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OPEN LOOP NASH EQUILIBRIUM OF N-PERSON NON-ZERO SUM
LINEAR-QUADRATIC DIFFERENTIAL GAMES WITH MAGNITUDE RESTRAINTS
1. Introduction . The dynamics of the differential game to be
considered are given by the following differential system in Rm :
n
(1.1) x=A(t)x + £ B i (t)u i .(t <t<I )
i=l
An initial condition is given by
(1.2) x(t ) = x
A(t) is a continuous (m x m) matrix on [t , TQ ], and the B^(t) are
continuous (m x q^) matrices on [t , T ]. Admissible controls u { are
Lebesque-measurable functions which almost everywhere on [t
,
T ] are
valued in \J±, the unit ball in the Euclidean space R . We now define
N cost functionals of "quadratic type":
(1.3) J^ui, u 2 , .... uN ) = <^(T ) - !"i, W i p(TQ ) - ?J^>
HI
+
J* ''^i^) " Ci(t)x(t) , Qi(t) [Zi (t) - C t (t)x(t)| >dt
fc
o
^ J
+ j^o |u i( t)|
2 dt
Here <
, J> denotes inner product, and | is the appropriate Euclidean
norm, depending on i. The ?j_ are vectors in R
1
; z . (t) are continuous
functions on [tQ , TQ ]; all matrices in (1.3) are continuous on [tD , TQ ],
while W^ is constant; and we also assume W. and Q.»(t) are symmetric.

In this paper we will prove the existence of an open loop Nash
equilibrium point for the above game called G; that is, admissible
controls (uj_, u„,
. .., u»,) such that
(1.4) ^(u-p u
2
, ..., uN) < Jj^Up u 2> ..., u i _ 1> u i9 " i+1 » -.-i uN )
for any admissible u., (1 < i < N) . We also will give a method for
approximating the equilibrium costs J^(u,, Q^, ..., %) > (1 5 i ^N).
We will use a certain penalty function method which was introduces in
[5] for approaching this problem; for a positive integer k, define N
cost functionals by
2k
(1.5) J i (u l , u 2 , ..., uN ) = J t (uL , u 2 , ..., uN ) + J*0 |u t (t)| dtt
o
Denote the differential game with costs given by (1.5) and where ad-f2ko |u^(t)
J
dt < <» by G^. The
""o
proof that G^ has an open loop Nash equilibrium (which yields a method
for approximating the equilibrium costs of G^) is deferred until section 3,
In section 2, the results of section 3 are used to prove the existence
of an open loop Nash equilibrium for G, and it is proven that for large
k, the equilibrium costs of G^ approximate those of G. The results of
sections 2 and 3 require a bound on T Q - t .
2. Main results . Proof of the following result, as well as a
computational method associated with its proof, will be dealt with in the
next section.

Theorem 2.1 . If TQ - t Q is sufficiently small, then G has a
unique open loop Nash equilibrium .
We will denote the bound required on T - t by M, and the equilibrium
k k k k
of G by (u. , u ? , ..., uw) • l ne following maps of R
1 into R are now
defined:
<k(v) =
if [v
J
< k
,
,2k
%k
otherwise
The following payoff functionals are also defined for i = 1, 2, . .
.
, N:
Tn k
k
Qi ° / \
i
(up u2 , ..., uN ) = J.(Ul , u 2> ..., uN ) + J^ (JK (Ui(t)j dt.
It is not difficult to see that
k
k ^i
!
J
i (
u l> u 2> •••» un) " J i (u l» u 2'(2.2)
• V I ^
Tn - to o
for any vector of controls (u,,
,
u ) which is feasible for G, .
We will require the following lemma:
max sup T jw
Lemma 2.1 . If T Q - t Q < M, then i k |"i(t) | dt < Q < ».
t
o
The proof of Lemma 2.1 is a computation employing Holder's
inequality. Details will be omitted.
Let \j be the set of vectors in R1 with Euclidean length
< 1 - k , and let P^ k (.) denote the Euclidean distance in R
L from
k
i"£_J
.
. Lemma 2 . 1 imp 1 ie s
(2.,, ?
t
> » (*t
>)
dt <
^

-4-
From Theorem 2.1 and (2.2) we have for any u t feasible in G,Jk
,k
to A^ t / k
k k A ,. k k k k(2.4) Ji("i, "2> ••> V = J i vu i» u 2 > ••*' ui-i» V u i+l, '•••
To " t Q
+
for 1 < i < N and each positive integer k.
-kLet G denote the game with the same costs as G, namely (1.3),
where admissible controls are Lebesque measurable functions u^ which
almost everywhere on [t Q , T ] take values in \J ± t the ball of radius
k m R
.
We now prove
Lemma 2.2 . Let T Q - t <: M. Then there exists a constant D >
such that the following is true : For each positive integer k there is
a vector of controls (u^ , U2 , • •
•
, u^) feasible for G^ such that
~i. /vk ~k ^k /\k /v^ ^k aj,(2.5) Ji(u^, u 2 , ..., uN ) < Ji (u 1 , u 2 , ..., u i_ 1> Ui , u i4l , ... uN)
-k -V (To " fc )
+ D(k + 1 - k *k) + —
k
for any u t feasible for Gk , i = 1, 2, . . . , N.
Proof
.
Let v be an arbitrary vector in R 1
,
and lettU^v) denote
the subset of \J* such that
O i)k (v) = Oi^ |v,U£(v)j , the distance of v toU^(v).

A lexicographic ordering on R is defined as follows: We say
(v 1? v 2 , . .., v 5 ) < < (v 1; v 2 , ..., vi)
if either v^ < vj or v- = v^ for j |> s and v g £ v for some s = 2, 3, ..., i.
Thus, given v e R , there is a unique v e \t ^(v) such that v < < v for
all v e"\J.(v). Thus we have a single valued mapping """ of R 1 onto
Now let v(t) be any Lebesque-measurable function valued in R
.
(This is equivalent to the components of v(t) being real valued Lebesque-
measurable functions.) By a result due to Fillipov (see [l] or [2]) we
have that v(t) is also Lebesque-measurable.
By a routine calculation (additional details are in [5]), we now
have that (2.5) holds; (2.3) is made use of here.
We now can prove the following result:
Theorem 2.2 . If T - t < M, then G has an open loop Nash
equilibrium .
Proof . In view of the fact that {uj_} is a bounded sequence in
the space of square-integrable controls, i = 1, 2, . .
.
, N, there is a
sequence k such that for each i
(2.6) u. w > u. (weak convergence)
for a measurable control u^ valued almost everywhere in vj; this last
r -i ~Vby the proof of Lemma 2.4.1 in [2 J. Let x denote the trajectory
~k ^k ~k
corresponding to (u^
,
u 2 > •••> UN )• By results in section 2.4 in

[2] we have xk —£ x uniformly, where x is the trajectory corresponding
to (a lt G 2 , ..., uN ).
By [4] p. 209, we have for i = 1, 2, ..., N
T , ' T
» o i^k. . ,2
... fc r
ro i_ ^n .2(2.7) lim inf j ° |u*(t) | dt > f° ^(t) j
Zdt.
K t *»
o
Using (2.5), the form of the J^, the convergence of {x } and (2.7),
the proof of the theorem is completed.
3. Proof of Theorem 2.1 . By [2], section 8.5 and also [4], we
have that the second Gateaux differentials of the J. are positive when
T - t is sufficiently small. The condition of stationarity (that00
is all the J^ having zero first Gateaux derivatives) is given by the
following system of integral equations:
2k-2
(3.1) 2Ui (s) -:- 2k | Ui (s) I Ui (s)
= - B*(s) J*(T , s) WiCxO^,) - Sil + f° B*(s) J*(t, s) C*(t) Q^t)t o
[z
L
(t) - x(t)] dt
for i = 1, 2, ..., N. Here '' denotes the matrix transpose and J£ is the
fundamental solution of x = A(t)x. The symmetry of the W. and Q . (t) were
used in the derivation of (3.1). A solution to (3.1) is an open loop
Nash equilibrium for G^. We rewrite the system (3.1) as follows:

7-
(3.2) [MiL(t)j, M^fu2 (t)J , ..., %L(t)J ]
= Tk [M£ (Ul (t)] , m'* ju2 (t)J , ..., M^|uN (t)^ ].
k iHere the M. are maps of R into itself given by
k 2k-2
Mi (v) = 2v + 2k|v | v.
The Mi are invertible, and the inverses are given by
.1 w
M
i
(W) 2+2k[rk (|w|22k-2
i i
•
2k_1
i
where rk (|w|) is the unique real root of 2kx + 2x - |w | . Also, Tk
is an operator taking C ' 1^, TQ ] x C
'
2 [to , T ] x ... x C°'
N
[t
,
TQ ]
into itself. Notice that the invertibility of the M^ imply that (3.1)
can be expressed in the form (3.2).
We now claim that each operator Tk is a contraction when T - t < M.
This is an analog of Theorem 4.2 in [5], and details are omitted here.
A computational procedure for uniformly approximating the solution of
(3.1), which avoids the difficulty that r, has no explicit form for
k > 2, is given in section 5 of [5] for N=2, but easily generalizes to
the present case.
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